Pairwise cooperations in selfish ring routing for minimax linear latency  by Chen, Xujin et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 447 (2012) 26–37
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Theoretical Computer Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Pairwise cooperations in selfish ring routing for minimax linear latency
Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu ∗, Weidong Ma
Institute of Applied Mathematics, AMSS, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, PR China
a r t i c l e i n f o
Keywords:
Selfish routing
Linear latency
Nash equilibrium
Price of anarchy
Pairwise stability
a b s t r a c t
This paper studies the selfish routing game in ring networks with a load-dependent linear
latency on each link. We adopt the asymmetric atomic routing model. Each player selfishly
chooses a route to connect his source-destination pair, aiming at the lowest latency of his
route, while the system objective is to minimize the maximum latency among all routes
of players. The effectiveness of these routing games is often measured by the price of
anarchy (PoA), the worst-case ratio between themaximum latencies in a Nash equilibrium
(NE) and in a system optimum, where NE refers to a ‘‘stable state’’ among all players,
from which no player has the incentive to deviate unilaterally. In classical setting, no
cooperation is allowed and 16 stands as the current best upper bound on the PoA of
such selfish ring routing. In this paper we show that the PoA is at most 10.16 provided
cooperationswithin pairs of players are allowed, where any two players could change their
routes simultaneously if neither would experience a longer latency and at least one would
experience a shorter latency.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In contrast to traditional routing in small-scale networks, routing in modern large networks often has no central control,
and involves a large number of disparate participants who are not interested in any global optimization and simply seek
to minimize their own costs or maximize their own profits by acting selfishly. Selfish routing [16] models network routing
from a game-theoretic perspective, in which network users are viewed as self-interested strategic players participating in
a competitive game. Each player, with his own pair of source and destination nodes in the network, aims to establish a
communication path (between his source and destination) along which he would experience latency as low as possible,
given the link congestion caused by all other players. Despite the system objective tominimize themaximum latency among
all source-destination pairs, in the absence of a central authority who can impose and maintain globally efficient routing
strategies on the network traffic [12], network designers are often interested in aNash equilibrium (NE) that is as close to the
system optimum as possible, where the NE is a ‘‘stable state’’ among the players, from which no player has the incentive to
deviate unilaterally. The (in)efficiency of NE is predominantly quantified by the so called price of anarchy (PoA), also known
as the coordination ratio [10,13], which is the worst-case ratio between the maximum latencies in an NE and in a system
optimum. This paper focuses on selfish routing in ring networks whose links are associated with load-dependent linear
latencies. In an effort to improve the efficiency of the selfish ring routing whose PoA has been upper bounded in [7] by
16, we show that the upper bound reduces to 10.16 provided cooperations within pairs of players are allowed, where two
players cooperate with each other only if neither would experience a longer latency and at least one would experience a
shorter latency when simultaneously changing their routes in the current routing.
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Related work. Our study on the ring topology is inspired by the fact that rings have been a fundamental topology frequently
encountered in communication networks, and attract considerable attention and efforts from the research community
[3,6,8,17,18].
Among the vast literature on selfish routing (see e.g., [12]), the study on egalitarian system objectives falls behind its
utilitarian counterparts, such as [5,9,15] to name a few. In particular, when the system performance is measured by the
maximum latency (whose minimization is thus desirable), the PoA of atomic congestion games [14] with linear latency
is 2.5 in single-commodity network (i.e., all source nodes are identical and all destination nodes are identical; all players
have the same strategy set), but it explodes toΘ(
√
m) inm-commodity networks [9]; namely the PoA is unbounded when
the games are asymmetric. Analogously, selfish routing for minimizing maximum latency in general networks may have
unbounded PoA, as shown by the example in [8]. On the other hand, as proved in [8], when network topology is further
restricted to rings, the selfish ring routing with linear latency possesses the nice property that for any instance either every
optimal routing is an NE or the PoA of the instance is at most 4 + 2√2 < 6.83, which says that the price of stability (the
best-case ratio between objective values at NE and optimum [2]) of the selfish ring routing is smaller than 6.83. Recently,
Chen et al. [7] have upper bounded the PoA of this selfish ring routing by constant 16.
The stable solution concept of k-robustness investigated in this paper is similar to and stronger than the extensively
studied k-strong equilibria (see e.g., [1,4]). Our concept ensures stability against deviations by any coalition of at most k
players that can strictly benefit one member without harming other members, while the k-strongness only guarantees that
no coalition of at most k players can cooperatively deviate in a way that strictly benefits all the members. The cooperations
addressed in both definitions of k-robust equilibria and k-strong equilibria have the special feature that they do not violate
the selfish nature of players.
Our contributions. In this paper, by allowing cooperations within pairs of self-interested players, we establish a smaller
PoA upper bound for selfish ring routing with linear latency with respect to the system objective of minimizing maximum
latency (see Theorem 4.1). In addition to the theoretical improvement, our concrete example shows that this kind of
cooperation does lead to shortermaximum latency of the network system (see Fig. 1(b) and the explanation in Section 2). The
improvement on global efficiency brought by coordinationwithin small-sized coalitions is highly realizable in decentralized
environments since players themselves are able to determine easily (say by enumeration) coalitions of size at most k
(say k ≤ 2) whose deviations can make every member ‘‘better off’’. This approach is particularly useful for competitive
games involving a large number of players in large networks, where only small-scale communication and computation are
achievable.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2,we provide themathematicalmodel SRLC for the selfish ring routingwith cooperation.
In Section 3, we prove some basic properties for the NE in SRLC. In Section 4, we establish the main result that the PoA
of SRLC is at most 10.16 when cooperations within pairs of players are allowed. In Section 5, we discuss the stable state
SRLC can reach with the presence of pairwise cooperations. In Section 6, we conclude this paper with remarks on future
research.
2. Model
Ourmodel, selfish ring latencywith cooperation (SRLC), is specified by a quadruple I = (R, l, (si, ti)mi=1, k), usually called an
SRLCk instance or an SRLC instance. As illustrated in Fig. 1(a), the underlying network of I is a ring R = (V , E), an undirected
cycle, with node set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and link set E = {ei = vivi+1 : i = 1, 2, . . . , n}, where vn+1 = v1. By writing
P ⊆ R, wemean that P is a subgraph of R (possibly R itself) with node set V (P) and link set E(P). Each link e ∈ E is associated
with a load-dependent linear latency (function) le(x) = aex+ be, where ae, be are nonnegative constants, and x is an integer
variable indicating the load on e. There arem (≥ 2) source-destination node pairs (si, ti), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, in R corresponding
tom players 1, 2, . . . ,m. Each player i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) has a communication request for routing one unit of flow from his source
si ∈ V to his destination ti ∈ V − {si}, and his strategy set consists of two internally disjoint paths Pi and P¯i in ring R with
ends si and ti satisfying
V (Pi) ∩ V (P¯i) = {si, ti} and E(Pi) ∪ E(P¯i) = E, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
We set ¯¯Pi := Pi for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Different players may have the same source-destination pair, and nodes si, ti, i =
1, 2, . . . ,m, are not necessarily distinct.
A (feasible) routingπ for the SRLC instance I is a 0-1 functionπ onmultisetP := ∪mi=1{Pi, P¯i} such thatπ(Pi)+π(P¯i) = 1
for every i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. In view of the correspondence between π and player strategies adopted for the SRLC instance, we
abuse the notation slightly by writing π = {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qm}with the understanding that, for each i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, the one
unit of flow requested by player i is routed along path Qi ∈ {Pi, P¯i}, and correspondingly π(Qi) = 1 > 0 = π(Q¯i). Also we
write Qi ∈ π for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Each link e ∈ E bears a load πe with respect to π defined as
πe :=

P∈P :e∈E(P)
π(P) = |{Qi : e ∈ E(Qi), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m}|
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(a) R = (V , E). (b)m = 2. (c)m = 2 and 0 < ε < 1/2.
Fig. 1. The SRLC instances
equal the number of paths in {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qm} each of which goes through e. Every P ⊆ R is associated with a nonnegative
integer
lP(π) :=

e∈E(P)
le(πe) =

e∈E(P)
(aeπe + be),
which indicates roughly the total latencies of links on P experienced in π . (The wording ‘‘indicates roughly’’ changes to
‘‘equals’’ when every link of P is used by some player in the routing π .) Naturally, the latency experienced by player i and
the maximum latency experienced by the system are
Li(π) := lQi(π) for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and L(π) :=
m
max
i=1
Li(π), (2.1)
respectively. We call Li(π) the latency of player iwith respect to π , and L(π) themaximum latency of the routing π . A routing
for I is optimal if its maximum latency is minimum among all routings for I.
Given a routing π , a coalition of players gets a gain by changing simultaneously its members’ strategies/choices in
π if the change makes no latency of any member increase and makes the latency of at least one member decrease. In
I = (R, l, (si, ti)mi=1, k), integer k lies in [1,m], and a coalition of at most k players is allowed to form in order to get a
gain by changing whenever possible. In response to this kind of cooperation, a ‘‘stable’’ solution in the SRLCk is a strategy
profile, referred to as k-robust Nash equilibrium (k-robust NE), which no coalition of at most k players could get a gain by
changing their strategies simultaneously. So, a routing π = {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qm} is a k-robust NE or a k-robust Nash routing
(k-robust NR) if for all S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}with |S| ≤ k,
either lQi(π) < lQ¯i(π
′) for some i ∈ S or lQi(π) = lQ¯i(π ′) for all i ∈ S, (2.2)
where routingπ ′ is obtained fromπ by changingQi to Q¯i for all i ∈ S. Clearly, a k-robustNE is an h-robustNE for all 1 ≤ h ≤ k.
Note that 1-robust NE is exactly the classical Nash equilibrium, concerned with special cases S = {i}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, for
which (2.2) gives
lQi(π) ≤

e∈E(Q¯i)
le(πe + 1) for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (2.3)
The term ‘‘1-robust’’ will often be omitted for short. We point out that the notion of k-robust NE studied in this paper is
closely related to the so called k-strong equilibrium [1] referring to a strategy profile in which no coalition of size at most k
has any joint deviation beneficial to (strictly reducing the latencies of) all members. Note that every k-robust NE is a k-strong
equilibrium while the converse is not necessarily true.
In the SRLCk instance I, let π∗ be an optimal routing, and let π be a k-robust NR whose maximum latency L(π) is
maximum among all k-robust NRs for I. The ratio L(π)/L(π∗) is called the k-robust price of anarchy (k-RPoA) of I. Take
the 2-player case as an example, where k = 1 or 2. For the SRLCk instances depicted in Fig. 1(b), the k-RPoA is 2 when
k = 1 and reduces to 1 when k = 2. We see that cooperation of two players does help! In contrast, the k-RPoA of the SRLCk
instances in Fig. 1(c) is (5− 3ε)/(4− ε) for k = 1 and 2.
For fixed k, the notion of the k-RPoA extends to the SRLCk problem of all SRLCk instances, whose k-RPoA is set to be the
supremum of k-RPoA over all SRLCk instances. The goal of this paper is to upper bound the 2-RPoA of the SRLC2 problem.
3. Basic properties
In this section, we investigate Nash routings for an arbitrary SRLCk instance I = (R, l, (si, ti)mi=1, k). For any P ⊆ R and
any routing π for I, we often consider lP(π) :=e∈E(P) le(πe) =e∈E(P)(aeπe + be) as the sum of
laP(π) :=

e∈E(P)
aeπe and lbP(π) :=

e∈E(P)
be.
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Define notations:
||P||a :=

e∈E(P)
ae, ||P||b :=

e∈E(P)
be, and ||P|| := ||P||a + ||P||b.
It is worth noting that the equation lbP(π) = ||P||b always holds, though in contrast the integer laP(π) may be smaller or
bigger than or equal to ||P||a. So for any routing π we particularly have
lP(π) = laP(π)+ lbP(π) = laP(π)+ ||P||b. (3.1)
When P (⊆ R) is a path, complementary to it is the other path P¯ ⊆ R whose link-disjoint union with P forms R. We will
make explicit or implicit use of the following equations in our discussion:
||P||a + ||P¯||a = ||R||a, ||P||b + ||P¯||b = ||R||b, and ||P|| + ||P¯|| = ||R||. (3.2)
In the rest of the paper,we denote byπ▽ = {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qm} a given routing for the SRLCk instanceI = (R, l, (si, ti)mi=1, k)
in which players 1, 2, . . . ,m are named such that for a minimum jwith 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we have
πN = {Q¯1, . . . , Q¯j,Qj+1, . . . ,Qm} is a NR for I, and
γ := maxji=1 ||Q¯i||a||Qi||a =
||Q¯1||a
||Q1||a ; so laR(πN) ≤ max{γ , 1} laR(π▽).
(3.3)
If Q¯p = Qq for some p, qwith 1 ≤ p ≠ q ≤ j, thenwithout loss of generality {p, q} = {j−1, j}; it follows thatQj−1 = Q¯j ∈ πN ,
Qj = Q¯j−1 ∈ πN , and we can express πN as πN = {Q¯1, . . . , Q¯j−2,Qj−1, . . . ,Qm}, contradicting the minimality of j. Thus
{Q¯1, . . . , Q¯j} ∩ {Q1, . . . ,Qj} = ∅. (3.4)
By (3.2), we see from ||Q¯1||a = γ ||Q1||a in (3.3) that
||Q1||a = ||R||a/(γ + 1). (3.5)
Since R is the link-disjoint union of Qi and Q¯i for every i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, from (3.1), with R in place of P , we derive
lQ¯i(π
N)+ lQi(πN) = lR(πN) = laR(πN)+ lbR(πN) = laR(πN)+ ||R||b for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (3.6)
Applying (2.3) to the NR πN = {Q¯1, . . . , Q¯j,Qj+1, . . . ,Qm}, we obtain
lQ¯i(π
N) ≤ lQi(πN)+ ||Qi||a for i = 1, 2, . . . , j;
lQi(π
N) ≤ lQ¯i(πN)+ ||Q¯i||a for i = j+ 1, j+ 2, . . . ,m.
(3.7)
With the definition of L(πN) given by (2.1), an easy case analysis on (3.7) shows that L(πN) is bounded above by
(lQ (πN)+ lQ¯ (πN)+max{||Q ||a, ||Q¯ ||a})/2 for Q ∈ πN with lQ (πN) = L(πN). This in combination with (3.6) gives
L(πN) ≤ lR(π
N)+ ||R||a
2
= l
a
R(π
N)+ ||R||a + ||R||b
2
= l
a
R(π
N)+ ||R||
2
. (3.8)
Note from (3.6) and (3.7) that lR(πN) = lQ¯i(πN)+lQi(πN) ≤ 2lQi(πN)+||Qi||a for i = 1, 2, . . . , j. Thus the leftmost inequality
in (3.8) implies
L(πN) ≤ lQi(πN)+
||Qi||a
2
+ ||R||a
2
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , j. (3.9)
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that β and ρ are two positive numbers satisfying β = L(πN)/L(π▽), lR(π▽) ≤ 2ρL(π▽), and β > ρ , then
the following hold:
(i) β ≤ ρmax{γ , 1} + ||R||a/(2L(π▽)).
(ii) (βγ − β − 2ρ) lQ1(πN) ≤ 2ρ(βγ − ρ)L(π▽)+ (β + ρ)||Q1||a + ρ||R||a − (β − ρ)||R||b.
Proof. From (3.8) we have L(πN) ≤ 12 (lR(π)+ ||R||a), which in combination of (3.3) implies (i) as follows:
β = L(π
N)
L(π▽)
≤ max{γ , 1}lR(π
▽)+ ||R||a
2L(π▽)
≤ max{γ , 1}ρ + ||R||a
2L(π▽)
.
To prove (ii), we deduce from (3.8) that laR(π
N) ≥ 2L(πN) − ||R|| = 2βL(π▽) − ||R||. Thus laR(πN) ≥ βρ lR(π▽) − ||R||
which can be expressed using (3.1) as
j
i=1
||Q¯i||a +
k
i=j+1
||Qi||a ≥ β
ρ
j
i=1
||Qi||a + β
ρ
k
i=j+1
||Qi||a + β
ρ
||R||b − ||R||a − ||R||b.
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By applying (3.2) and substituting ||R||a − ||Q¯i||a for ||Qi||a, i = 1, 2, . . . , j, in the above inequality, we obtain
j
i=1
||Q¯i||a ≥ β
ρ

j · ||R||a −
j
i=1
||Q¯i||a

+

β
ρ
− 1
 k
i=j+1
||Qi||a +

β
ρ
− 1

||R||b − ||R||a.
Rearranging terms in the above inequality yields

β
ρ
+ 1
 j
i=1
||Q¯i||a ≥

β
ρ
j− 1

||R||a +

β
ρ
− 1
 k
i=j+1
||Qi||a +

β
ρ
− 1

||R||b.
Since β/ρ > 1, ignoring the nonnegative middle term on the right-hand side and dividing both sides by positive number
β/ρ + 1, we derive from the above inequality that
j
i=1
||Q¯i||a ≥ βj− ρ
β + ρ ||R||a +
β − ρ
β + ρ ||R||b. (3.10)
Let us now consider sum
j
i=1 ||Q¯i ∩ Q1||a, which equals the total contributions of paths Q¯1, Q¯2, . . . , Q¯j in the NR πN to
the value of laQ1(π
N). Clearly, the sum of the contributions is at least
laQ1(π
N)−
k
i=j+1
||Qi||a ≥ laQ1(πN)− laR(π▽),
and thus at least laQ1(π
N)− lR(π▽)+ ||R||b by (3.1). It follows from lR(π▽) ≤ 2ρL(π▽) that
j
i=1
||Q¯i ∩ Q1||a ≥ laQ1(πN)− 2ρL(π▽)+ ||R||b. (3.11)
On the other hand, since R is the link-disjoint union of Q1 and Q¯1, we have
laQ¯1(π
N) ≥
j
i=1
||Q¯i ∩ Q¯1||a ≥
j
i=1
||Q¯i||a − ||Q1||a .
In turn, using (3.10) and ||R||a = (γ + 1)||Q1||a in (3.5), we can lower bound laQ¯1(π
N) as follows:
laQ¯1(π
N) ≥
j
i=1
||Q¯i||a − ||Q1||a
≥ βj− ρ
β + ρ ||R||a − j · ||Q1||a +
β − ρ
β + ρ ||R||b
= j

β(γ + 1)
β + ρ − 1

||Q1||a − ρ
β + ρ ||R||a +
β − ρ
β + ρ ||R||b
≥ βγ − ρ
β + ρ
j
i=1
||Q¯i ∩ Q1||a + (β − ρ)||R||b − ρ||R||a
β + ρ .
Furthermore, it follows from (3.11) that
laQ¯1(π
N) ≥ βγ − ρ
β + ρ

laQ1(π
N)− 2ρL(π▽)+ ||R||b

+ (β − ρ)||R||b − ρ||R||a
β + ρ . (3.12)
Applying (3.1) and (3.7), we have
lQ1(π
N)+ ||Q1||a ≥ lQ¯1(πN) = laQ¯1(π
N)+ ||Q¯1||b.
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Combining the above inequality with (3.12) and using ||R||b = ||Q1||b + ||Q¯1||b ≥ ||Q1||b, we deduce that
lQ1(π
N)+ ||Q1||a ≥ βγ − ρ
β + ρ

laQ1(π)− 2ρL(π▽)+ ||R||b

+ (β − ρ)||R||b − ρ||R||a
β + ρ + ||Q¯1||b
≥ βγ − ρ
β + ρ

laQ1(π
N)− 2ρL(π▽)+ ||Q1||b

+ β(||Q1||b + ||Q¯1||b)− ρ||R||a − ρ||R||b
β + ρ
≥ βγ − ρ
β + ρ

lQ1(π
N)− 2ρL(π▽)

+ β ||R||b − ρ||R||a − ρ||R||b
β + ρ
= βγ − ρ
β + ρ

lQ1(π
N)− 2ρL(π▽)

+ (β − ρ)||R||b − ρ||R||a
β + ρ .
Thus we obtain
(β + ρ)lQ1(πN)+ ||Q1||a ≥ (βγ − ρ)lQ1(πN)− 2ρL(π▽)+ (β − ρ)||R||b − ρ||R||a,
which is equivalent to the inequality in (ii). The lemma is then proved. 
Lemma 3.2. Let β = L(πN)/L(π▽). Then the following hold:
(i) β ≤ 10.16 if lR(π▽) ≤ 5L(π▽) and ||R||a ≤ 2.5L(π▽).
(ii) β ≤ 7.05 if lR(π▽) ≤ 3L(π▽) and ||R||a ≤ 3L(π▽).
Proof. To see (i), assume to the contrary β > 10.16. By lR(π▽) ≤ 5L(π▽) , the conditions in Lemma 3.1 are satisfied with
ρ = 2.5. We then deduce from Lemma 3.1 and ||R||a ≤ 2.5L(π▽) that
γ = max{γ , 1} ≥ β
ρ
− ||R||a
2ρL(π▽)
>
10.16
2.5
− 2.5
5
= 3.564 (3.13)
and
(βγ − β − 5)lQ1(πN) ≤ 5(βγ − 2.5)L(π▽)+ (β + 2.5)||Q1||a + 2.5||R||a − (β − 2.5)||R||b
≤ 5(βγ − 2.5)L(π▽)+ (β + 2.5)||Q1||a + 2.5||R||a.
Note fromassumptionβ > 10.16 andγ > 3.564 in (3.13) thatβγ−β−5 > 0, and from (3.5) that ||Q1||a = ||R||aγ+1 ≤ 2.5 L(π
▽)
γ+1 .
With (3.9) we get
L(πN) ≤ lQ1(πN)+
||Q1||a
2
+ ||R||a
2
≤ 5(βγ − 2.5)
βγ − β − 5 L(π
▽)+

β + 2.5
βγ − β − 5 +
1
2

||Q1||a +

2.5
βγ − β − 5 +
1
2

||R||a
≤ 5(βγ − 2.5)
βγ − β − 5 L(π
▽)+ β(γ + 1)
2(βγ − β − 5) ·
2.5L(π▽)
γ + 1 +
β(γ − 1)
2(βγ − β − 5) · 2.5L(π
▽)
= 12.5βγ − 25
2(βγ − β − 5) L(π
▽).
As γ > 0 by (3.13), the derivative of 12.5βγ−252(βγ−β−5) with respect to β is negative for all β > 0. So, using β > 10.16, we obtain
10.16 < β = L(π
N)
L(π▽)
≤ 12.5βγ − 25
2(βγ − β − 5) ≤
12.5(10.16γ )− 25
2(10.16γ − 10.16− 5) =
127γ − 25
20.32γ − 30.32 .
Now 127γ−2520.32γ−30.32 > 10.16 implies γ < 3.563, a contradiction to (3.13), proving (i).
We verify (ii) similarly. By contradiction assume β > 7.05. With ρ = 1.5, Lemma 3.1 gives
γ = max{γ , 1} ≥ β
ρ
− ||R||a
2ρL(π▽)
>
7.05
1.5
− 3
3
= 3.7 (3.14)
and
(βγ − β − 3)lQ1(πN) ≤ 3(βγ − 1.5)L(π▽)+ (β + 1.5)||Q1||a + 1.5||R||a − (β − 1.5)||R||b.
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Note from (3.14) that βγ − β − 3 > 0, and from (3.5) that ||Q1||a = ||R||aγ+1 ≤ 3 L(π
▽)
γ+1 .With (3.9) we get
L(πN) ≤ lQ1(πN)+
||Q1||a
2
+ ||R||a
2
≤ 3(βγ − 1.5)
βγ − β − 3 L(π
▽)+

β + 1.5
βγ − β − 3 +
1
2

· 3L(π
▽)
γ + 1 +

1.5
βγ − β − 3 +
1
2

· 3L(π▽)
= 9βγ − 9
2(βγ − β − 3) L(π
▽).
As γ > 0 by (3.14), the derivative of 9βγ−92(βγ−β−3) with respect to β is negative for all β > 0. So, using β > 7.05, we obtain
7.05 < β = L(π
N)
L(π▽)
≤ 9βγ − 9
2(βγ − β − 3) ≤
9(7.05γ )− 9
2(7.05γ − 7.05− 3) =
63.45γ − 9
14.1γ − 20.1 ,
implying γ < 3.6909. The contradiction to (3.14) establishes (ii). 
4. 2-robust Nash routings
The result established in this section provides the evidence that small-sized cooperations might help decrease PoA in
selfish ring routing games, which is desirable for network design. In case of k = 1, no cooperation is allowed, and the PoA of
the SRLC1 problem has been shown in [7] to be bounded above by 16. In case of k = 2, two players may act simultaneously
to gain benefit for at least one without increasing latency of the other (see Fig. 1(b)). The following theorem shows a smaller
upper bound for the PoA of the SRLC2 problem in case of 2-robust NE existing.
Theorem 4.1. The 2-robust price of anarchy of the SRLC2 problem is at most 10.16.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary 2-robust Nash routing πN for an SRLC2 instance I = (R, l, (si, ti)mi=1, 2). If some link e of ring
R = (V , E) has ae + be = 0, then shrinking e gives an SRLC2 instance with the same PoA. So for ease of description, we
assume without loss of generality that
ae + be > 0 for all e ∈ E. (4.1)
For any subgraphs P and Q of the ring R, by P ∪ Q (resp. P ∩ Q ) we mean the subgraph of R with node set V (P) ∪ V (Q )
(resp. V (P)∩V (Q )) and link set E(P)∪ E(Q ) (resp. E(P)∩ E(Q )), which obviously consists of at most two paths when P and
Q are paths in R.
Clearly I admits an optimal routing π∗ that is irredundant in the sense that any two paths P,Q ∈ π∗ with P ∪Q = R are
link-disjoint. Set
β := L(πN)/L(π∗).
It suffices to show β ≤ 10.16. To this end, we may assume
π∗ = π▽ = {Q1, . . . ,Qj,Qj+1, . . . ,Qm} ≠ πN = {Q¯1, . . . , Q¯j,Qj+1, . . . ,Qm} (4.2)
be as described in Section 3, for otherwise β = 1 and we are done.
If some Q¯g and Q¯h with 1 ≤ g < h ≤ j are link-disjoint, then Qg ∪ Qh = R, and since π▽ is irredundant, it must be the
case that Q¯g = Qh and equivalently Q¯h = Qg , a contradiction to (3.4). Hence
E(Q¯g) ∩ E(Q¯h) ≠ ∅ for all 1 ≤ g < h ≤ j. (4.3)
With the leftmost equation in (3.6), we may assume
lQi(π
N)+ lQ¯i(πN) = lR(πN) > 10.16L(π▽) for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (4.4)
as otherwise definition (2.1) implies L(πN) ≤ lR(πN) ≤ 10.16L(π▽) giving β ≤ 10.16. By definition,
||Qi||a ≤ ||Qi|| ≤ lQi(π▽) ≤ L(π▽) for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (4.5)
For the Nash routing πN , we deduce from the first set of inequalities in (3.7) that
lQi(π
N) ≥ lQ¯i(πN)− ||Qi||a ≥ lQ¯i(πN)− L(π▽) for all iwith 1 ≤ i ≤ j, (4.6)
and then from (4.4) that
lQi(π
N) ≥ lQ¯i(π
N)+ lQi(πN)− L(π▽)
2
> 4.58 · L(π▽) for all iwith 1 ≤ i ≤ j. (4.7)
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(a) Case 1. (b) Case 2. (c) Case 3.
Fig. 2. Possible configurations of πN when lR(πN ) > 10.16L(π▽).
If some Qg with 1 ≤ g ≤ j is link-disjoint from ∪ji=1Q¯i, then (4.2) implies lQg (πN) ≤ lQg (π▽) ≤ L(π▽), a contradiction to
(4.7). So we have
E(Qg) ∩

∪ji=1E(Q¯i)

≠ ∅ for all g with 1 ≤ g ≤ j; in particular j ≥ 2. (4.8)
It is not difficult to see from (4.3) and (4.8) that one of the following three cases (illustrated in Fig. 2) must be true:
Case 1: There exist p, q, and r with 1 ≤ p < q < r ≤ j such that Q¯p∪ Q¯q  R, Q¯q∪ Q¯r  R, Q¯r ∪ Q¯p  R, and Q¯p∪ Q¯q∪ Q¯r = R.
Case 2: There exist p and qwith 1 ≤ p < q ≤ j such that Q¯p ∪ Q¯q = R.
Case 3: There exist p and qwith 1 ≤ p < q ≤ j such that ∪ji=1Q¯i ⊆ Q¯p ∪ Q¯q  R.
Here, no other cases are possible, since (4.3) says that each pair of paths in Q¯1, Q¯2, . . . , Q¯j must have at least one common
link. Let the indices p, q and r satisfying one of the above three cases be fixed. Our case analysis goes as follows:
Case 1. It is easy to see that Qp ∪ Qq ∪ Qr = R (cf. Fig. 2(a)), which implies
||R||a ≤ ||R|| ≤ lR(π▽) ≤ lQp(π▽)+ lQq(π▽)+ lQr (π▽) ≤ 3L(π▽).
Hence Lemma 3.2(ii) guarantees β ≤ 7.05 as desired.
Case 2. Consider any g and hwith 1 ≤ g < h ≤ j and Q¯g ∪ Q¯h = R. Let routing π ′ be obtained from πN by changing Q¯g and
Q¯h to Qg and Qh, respectively. It is straightforward from (4.2) that
lQg (π
′) = lQg (πN) and lQh(π ′) = lQh(πN). (4.9)
Suppose by symmetry that lQ¯g (π
N) ≤ lQ¯h(πN). Since E(Q¯g)∩ E(Q¯h) ≠ ∅ by (4.3), we deduce from (4.1) that lQ¯g∩Q¯h(πN) > 0
and further that
lQh(π
′) = lQ¯g (πN)− lQ¯g∩Q¯h(πN) ≤ lQ¯h(πN)− lQ¯g∩Q¯h(πN) < lQ¯h(πN).
As πN is a 2-robust NE where coalition S = {g, h} cannot get a gain, it can be seen from condition (2.2) with πN in place of π
over there that lQ¯g (π
N) < lQg (π
′) and subsequently that lQ¯g (π
N) < lQg (π
N) by (4.9). Hence lQg (π
N) > lQ¯g (π
N) ≥ lQh(πN)
follows from Q¯g ⊇ Qh and in turn
lQg (π
N) > lQ¯h(π
N)− L(π▽)
follows from (4.6). Using the fact that Q¯h is the link-disjoint union of Q¯g ∩ Q¯h and Qg (cf. Fig. 2(b)), we obtain
lQ¯g∩Q¯h(π
N) = lQ¯h(πN)− lQg (πN) < L(π▽) for all g, hwith 1 ≤ g < h ≤ j and Q¯g ∪ Q¯h = R. (4.10)
Recall from (4.7) that lQi(π
N) > 4.58L(π▽) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , j, which in combination with (4.10) implies
E(Qi) ∩ E(Qg ∪ Qh) ≠ ∅ for all i, g, hwith 1 ≤ i ≤ j, 1 ≤ g < h ≤ j and Q¯g ∪ Q¯h = R. (4.11)
Now we turn to the indices p, q that have been fixed in the hypothesis of Case 2. By (4.11) one can easily find (not
necessarily distinct) paths P1p , P
2
p , P
1
q , P
2
q in {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qj} − {Qp,Qq} such that
E(Phg ) ∩ E(Qg) ≠ ∅ for h = 1, 2, g = p, q;
j
i=1
Qj ⊆

g=p,q
(Qg ∪ P1g ∪ P2g ); (4.12)
and subject to (4.12),Q := {P1p , P2p , P1q , P2q } is as small as possible. (4.13)
Note 0 ≤ |Q| ≤ 4. From (4.2) and the inclusion relation in (4.12) we see that
lQ¯p∩Q¯q(π
▽)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN) ≤ l ∪P∈QP(π
▽) ≤

P∈Q
lP(π▽).
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(a)Q = {P1p , P2p , P1q }. (b)Q = {P1p , P2p , P1q , P2q }.
Fig. 3. Case 2 when |Q| = 3 or 4.
Recall from (4.5) that lP(π▽) ≤ L(π▽) for all P ∈ Q. Therefore
lQ¯p∩Q¯q(π
▽)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN) ≤ |Q| · L(π▽). (4.14)
Observe that R is the link-disjoint union of Qp, Qq and Q¯p ∩ Q¯q. It follows from (4.5) and (4.10) that
||R||a ≤ ||Qp||a + ||Qq||a + 12 lQ¯p∩Q¯q(π
N) ≤ 2.5L(π▽).
When lR(π▽) ≤ 5L(π▽), Lemma 3.2(i) gives β ≤ 10.16 as desired. So in the remaining proof of Case 2, we consider
lR(π▽) > 5L(π▽). (4.15)
Notice from (4.5) and (4.10) that
lQ¯p∩Q¯q(π
▽)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN) = lR(π▽)− lQp(π▽)− lQq(π▽)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)
> 5L(π▽)− 3L(π▽) = 2L(π▽),
which together with (4.14) implies thatQ = {P1p , P2p , P1q , P2q } has size 3 or 4. In particular we see that Q¯p∩ Q¯q consists of two
paths X, Y each of which has at least one link (cf. the left picture in Fig. 2(b), and Fig. 3).
In case of |Q| = 3, property (4.12) and the minimality of |Q| in (4.13) together with symmetry allow us to assume that
Q = {P1p , P2p , P1q } such that (see Fig. 3(a) for an illustration)
E(P1p ) ∩ E(Qq) = ∅, E(P1q ) ∩ E(Qp) = ∅,
E(P2p ) ∩ E(X)  E(P1p ) ∩ E(X) ≠ ∅, E(P1q ) ∩ E(X) ≠ ∅, and
E(P1p ) ∩ E(Y )  E(P2p ) ∩ E(Y ) ≠ ∅.
If P1q has an end in P
2
p , then P
1
q ⊃ Qq and P1p ∪ P2p ∪ P1q ∪ Qp ∪ (Q¯p ∩ Q¯q) = R; in turn (4.2) and the inclusion relation in (4.12)
guarantees lR(π▽) ≤ P∈Q lP(π▽) + lQp(π▽) + lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN); consequently a contradiction lR(π▽) < 5L(π▽) would implied
by (4.5) and (4.10). Thus
V (P1q ) ∩ V (P2p ) = ∅. (4.16)
Similarly if V (P1p ) ∩ V (P2p ) is nonempty, then E(P1p ) ∩ E(Qq) = ∅ and (4.16) ensure the existence of a common node of P1p
and P2p in Qp, and lR(π
▽) ≤P∈Q lP(π▽)+ lQq(π▽)+ lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN) < 5L(π▽) turns out a contradiction. Hence we have
V (P1p ) ∩ V (P2p ) = ∅. (4.17)
Combining (4.16) with E(P1p ) ∩ E(Qq) = ∅we deduce that P1q ⊆ (P¯1p ∩ P¯2p ) ∪ (Q¯p ∩ Q¯q) and therefore
lP1q (π
N) ≤ lP¯1p∩P¯2p (πN)+ lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN) < lP¯1p∩P¯2p (πN)+ L(π▽)
by (4.10). Notice from (4.17) that (4.10) applies with Qg = P1p and Qh = P2p , and provides lP¯1p∩P¯2p (πN) < L(π▽), implying
lP1q (π
N) < 2L(π▽), a contradiction to (4.7).
In case of |Q| = 4 (see Fig. 3(b) for an illustration), the minimality in (4.13) enforces
E(Qp) ∩ E(P1q ∪ P2q ) = ∅ and E(Qq) ∩ E(P1p ∪ P2p ) = ∅. (4.18)
AsQ = {P1p , P2p , P1q , P2q } ⊆ {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qj}, by (4.11) and (4.18) we must have P¯1q ∪ P¯2q ≠ R and P¯1p ∪ P¯2p ≠ R. Furthermore,
(4.18) yields E(P1g )∩ E(P2g ) ≠ ∅ and Qg ⊂ P1g ∪ P2g for g = p, q, giving (∪P∈QP)∪ (Q¯p ∩ Q¯q) = R. Moreover it can be deduced
from (4.12) that ∪ji=1Qi ⊆ ∪P∈QP . Therefore
lR(π▽) ≤

P∈Q
lP(π▽)+ lQ¯p∩Q¯q(π▽) ≤ 4L(π▽)+ lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)
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by (4.5), and consequently lR(π▽) ≤ 5L(π▽) by (4.10). The contradiction to assumption (4.15) completes the proof of
Case 2.
Case 3. Recalling the right-most inequality in (4.5), it is obvious from (4.2) that
lQp∩Qq(π
N)+ ||Qi||a ≤ lQi(π▽) ≤ L(π▽) for i = p and q; and (4.19)
lR(π▽) ≤ lQp(π▽)+ lQq(π▽)+ lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN) ≤ 2L(π▽)+ lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN). (4.20)
Since Qq is the link-disjoint union of Qp ∩ Qq and a subpath of Q¯p, see Fig. 2(c), we have
lQ¯p(π
N) ≥ lQq(πN)− lQp∩Qq(πN).
Using the first inequality of (4.6) with i = p, q over there and the preceding inequality, we deduce that
lQp(π
N) ≥ lQ¯p(πN)− ||Qp||a
≥ lQq(πN)− lQp∩Qq(πN)− ||Qp||a
≥ lQ¯q(πN)− ||Qq||a − lQp∩Qq(πN)− ||Qp||a,
and further that
lQ¯p∩Q¯q(π
N) = lQ¯q(πN)−

lQp(π
N)− lQp∩Qq(πN)

≤ 2 lQp∩Qq(πN)+ ||Qp||a + ||Qq||a.
It follows from (4.19) that lQ¯p∩Q¯q(π
N) ≤ 2L(π▽), which in combination with (4.20) gives
lR(π▽) ≤ 4L(π▽). (4.21)
By symmetry we suppose lQ¯p(π
N) ≤ lQ¯q(πN). Let routing π ′ be obtained from πN by changing Q¯p and Q¯q to Qp and Qq,
respectively. The hypothesis ∪ji=1Q¯i ⊆ Q¯p ∪ Q¯q of Case 3 implies
Qp ∩ Qq ⊆ Qi for all i = 1, 2, . . . , j.
Then the relation between π▽ and πN specified in (4.2) gives
lQp∩Qq(π
N) = lQp∩Qq(π▽)− j||Qp ∩ Qq||a, and lQp∩Qq(πN)+ 2||Qp ∩ Qq||a ≤ lQp∩Qq(π▽) (4.22)
as j ≥ 2 by (4.8). Instantly, we get
lQp∩Qq(π
′) = lQp∩Qq(πN)+ 2||Qp ∩ Qq||a ≤ lQp∩Qa(π▽). (4.23)
Consider the case where lQp∩Qq(π▽) < lQ¯p∩Q¯q(π
N). From assumption lQ¯p(π
N) ≤ lQ¯q(πN)we deduce that
lQq(π
′) = lQ¯p(πN)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)+ lQp∩Qa(π ′)
≤ lQ¯q(πN)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)+ lQp∩Qq(π▽)
< lQ¯q(π
N).
Since πN is a 2-robust NE where coalition S = {p, q} cannot get a gain, by (2.2), with πN in place of π over there, it must be
the case that lQp(π
′) > lQ¯p(π
N) saying lQ¯q(π
N)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)+ lQp∩Qq(π ′) > lQ¯p(πN). On the one hand it follows from (4.23)
that
lQ¯q(π
N)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)+ lQp∩Qq(π▽) > lQ¯p(πN). (4.24)
On the other hand, since πN is a Nash routing, (2.3) says
lQ¯q(π
N) ≤

e∈E(Qq)
le(πNe + 1)
=

lQ¯p(π
N)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)

+ ||Qq||a − ||Qp ∩ Qq||a+ lQp∩Qq(πN)+ ||Qp ∩ Qq||a.
Using (4.22), we get
lQ¯q(π
N) ≤ lQ¯p(πN)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)+ ||Qq||a − ||Qp ∩ Qq||a + lQp∩Qq(π▽).
Clearly, we may replace lQ¯q(π
N) in (4.24) with the right hand side of the above inequality, which gives
lQ¯p(π
N)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)+ ||Qq||a − ||Qp ∩ Qq||a + lQp∩Qq(π▽)− lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)+ lQp∩Qq(π▽) > lQ¯p(πN).
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(a) 0 < ε < 1. (b) 0 < ε < 1/3. (c) 0 < ε < 1/8.
Fig. 4. The SRLC instances with no 2-robust NE.
Rearranging and collecting terms provides 2lQ¯p∩Q¯q(π
N) < 2lQp∩Qq(π▽)+ (||Qq||a− ||Qp ∩Qq||a). Hence we have shown that
in any case
lQ¯p∩Q¯a(π
N) ≤ lQp∩Qq(π▽)+
1
2
(||Qq||a − ||Qp ∩ Qq||a).
It follows that
||R||a = ||Qp ∪ Qq||a + ||Q¯p ∩ Q¯q||a
≤ lQp∪Qq(π▽)+ lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)
= lQp(π▽)+ lQq(π▽)− lQp∩Qq(π▽)+ lQ¯p∩Q¯q(πN)
≤ lQp(π▽)+ lQq(π▽)+
1
2
||Qq||a.
Thus ||R||a ≤ 2.5L(π▽) by (4.5). Since lR(π▽) ≤ 4L(π▽) by (4.21), Lemma 3.2(i) ensures β ≤ 10.16.
We are now able to conclude that β ≤ 10.16 in all Cases 1–3, which establishes Theorem 4.1. 
5. Pairwise cooperation vs. stability
In this section, we are concerned with the stability of SRLC against unilateral and bilateral deviations, and in particular
with the existence of 2-robust NE. We will show that pairwise stability can be nicely approximated in SRLC.
It is well known, see e.g., [11], that every SRLC instance I = (R, l, (si, ti)mi=1, k) possesses at least one NE whose existence
can be proved by using the so-called potential function Φ , defined by Φ(π) =e∈E(R)πex=1 le(x), on the set of all routings
for I.
Lemma 5.1. Let π be a routing for the SRLC instance I. Then π is a Nash routing for I if and only if Φ(π) is a local minimum
ofΦ .
However, this nice result does not extend to 2-robust NE when pairwise deviations are allowed. Fig. 4 presents three
typical SRLC instances where unilateral deviations and bilateral deviation would alternate, and the systems never reach any
2-robust NE. In fact, none of the instances admit any 2-strong equilibrium. Recall that every 2-robust NE must be a 2-strong
equilibrium. It is easy to check that each instance admits a unique NE, where every player i adopts the clockwise path from
si to ti; but this NE does not prevent players 1 and 2 from jointly changing their routes which can bring both players shorter
latency.
Despite the possible absence of 2-robust NE from SRLC, certain stability against pairwise collusion can be guaranteed to
reach a satisfactory extent. Given an SRLC instance I and a number α ≥ 1, a NR π of I is said to be α-approximately pairwise
stable if there is no coalition of two players whose deviation from π can ensure each member a latency less than 1/α of the
latency he experiences in π , where all players outside the coalition are assumed to keep their routes unchanged and the
deviation of the coalition means every member of the coalition changing his route (to the other one). Clearly, every 2-robust
NE (if any) is α-approximately pairwise stable for all α ≥ 1.
Theorem 5.1. Every SRLC instance admits a 43 -approximate pairwise stable Nash routing.
Proof. Let I = (R, l, (si, ti)mi=1, k) be an SRLC instance and let π = {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qm} be a routing for I such that Φ(π) is
as small as possible. It is instant from Lemma 5.1 that π is a NR for I. If π is (4/3)-approximately pairwise stable then we
are done. So we assume otherwise and without loss of generality that the deviation of coalition {1, 2} from π gives routing
π ′ = {Q¯1, Q¯2,Q3, . . . ,Qm} such that
3Li(π) > 4Li(π ′) for every i = 1, 2. (5.1)
It follows from the minimality ofΦ(π) that
E(Q1) ∩ E(Q2) ≠ ∅ and E(R)− E(Q1 ∪ Q2) ≠ ∅
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as otherwise (5.1) would be violated. Define paths P := Q1 ∩ Q2 and Q := Q1 ∪ Q2. Without loss of generality we assume
L1(π ′) ≥ L2(π ′). It is easy to see that
L1(π)− L1(π ′) ≤

e∈E(P)
(aeπe + be)−

e∈E(Q )
(aeπ ′e + be).
Recall from the minimality ofΦ(π) that
0 ≤ Φ(π ′)− Φ(π)
=

e∈E(Q )
(2aeπ ′e − ae + 2be)−

e∈E(P)
(2aeπe − ae + 2be)
≤

e∈E(P)
ae − 2

e∈E(P)
(aeπe + be)−

e∈E(Q )
(aeπ ′e + be)

≤

e∈E(P)
ae − 2(L1(π)− L1(π ′)).
Since πe ≥ 2 for all e ∈ E(P) = E(Q1) ∩ E(Q2), we have L1(π) ≥ e∈E(P) 2ae. Hence 0 ≤ 12 L1(π) − 2(L1(π) − L1(π ′))
implies a contradiction to (5.1), proving the theorem. 
Complementary to the 4/3 approximation ratio in Theorem 5.1 is the lower bound 5/4 shown by the 2-player SRLC instance
depicted in Fig. 4(a), where the unique NR has maximum latency 5 and the deviation of coalition {1, 2} from the NR gives
the optimal routing of maximum latency 4+ ε.
6. Concluding remark
In this paper we have studied the selfish ring routing with linear latency for minimizing maximum latency that allows
coalitions among self-interested players (SRLC). We have proved that the 2-RPoA of SRLC is bounded above by 10.16. It
deserves further efforts to obtain smaller upper bound on k-RPoA for greater k. Since improvement on global efficiency due
to cooperation within small-sized coalitions is highly realizable in decentralized environments, it is interesting to see if the
method could be extended to selfish routing games in general networks for minimizing maximum latency, shortening the
systemmaximum latency via small coalitions and some other techniques. Obviously, it is a big challenge to shift study from
ring networks to other networks of more complicated topologies.
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